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Discussion After the Speeches of Stanley M. Spracker and J.
Christopher Thomas
QUESTION: Professor King- Chris, I note the disparity in the
economy between the United States and Mexico.
One of the problems that people were concerned about was that
Mexico had taken the U.S. environmental laws and put them in statutory form on their books. The problem before NAFTA was entered
into, was the staffing of the Mexican environmental laws - the monies
that had to be appropriated to enforce them.
NAFTA came about in the process. Mexico is a country with financial limitations, presumably limitations on the people who are qualified to enforce the laws. What is going to happen in terms of Mexico's
response when the U.S. says it needs negotiations that are going to
implement the Agreement and that Mexico must enforce its environmental laws? What will happen when Mexico responds, "Well, we are
limited." What is the sequence of events that is going to take place?
ANSWER: Mr. Thomas: I am going to respond to your question
in oblique fashion, if you do not mind, by focusing on the issue of devoting sufficient resources to environmental law enforcement. This issue
was initially focused on Mexico, but as the negotiations proceeded, it
became a more widely shared concern of the three countries. The concern is shown by the fact that there is language in the Agreement
which provides for two defenses where there is an allegation that a
party has failed to effectively enforce its environmental laws.
The first is that a Party has a defense where there has been a bona
fide reasonable exercise of discretion in respect to investigation, prosecution or penalizing an offender. This makes sense. The bona fide decisions of the Environmental Protection Agency, Environment Canada,
or SEDOSOL, as the case may be, should not be second-guessed.
Secondly, there is also language which deals with a situation
where a government has to establish priorities with respect to environmental law enforcement. And again, if there is a bona fide attempt to
allocate scarce resources by the party with respect to environmental
issues which are deemed by that party to have greater priorities than
others, then that can be evidence that the party is still effectively enforcing its environmental law.
On a practical note, there is no question that entering into the
NAFTA negotiations has led Mexico to make significant funding commitments with respect to stepping up its environmental law enforcement, particularly in the border area.
I might also add that - this is something which always intrigues
me - the United States has a tendency to overstate its position when it
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starts off a negotiation. This, I am convinced, results from the interplay
between the Administration and the Congress.
In trade, for example, all Congress hears about is how those miserable Japanese, Canadians, or other countries are restricting U.S. exports, and how all their imports are causing pain in the United States
market. Rarely does a Congressional hearing examine what a good deal
the U.S. has in the Canadian market, or about American investment
successes in Europe and Japan. It just does not happen. As a result,
this affects the way in which U.S. politicians and the negotiators they
instruct initially look at the world.
A good example in the environmental area was the testimony of
William K. Reilly when he was EPA Administrator.
He went to Congress to testify on NAFTA and the environment.
He was asked, "how can we make sure that the Canadians and the
Mexicans enforce their laws properly?" He responded that that was a
good question, noting that he had a stack of letters from members of
Congress all asking him not to enforce EPA regulations with respect to
leaking gas storage tanks. There were approximately 300 letters, all
asking him to relax EPA enforcement policy in order to relieve constituents of financial hardship.
Mr. Reilly pointed out that if the U.S. was going to ask the Mexicans and the Canadians to enforce their laws to the highest standard, it
would have to be prepared to meet those standards that it prescribed.
Thus, when the politicians began to think about these subjects, they
began to recognize that this was a bit more complicated than they had
originally thought, and there tended to be a softening of their original
positions.
ANSWER: Mr. Spracker: Another practical way in which this
has shown itself, is that before the Clinton Administration took office
and there was the negotiation of the Environmental Corps., there was
an effort by the Bush Administration to demonstrate environmental improvement with respect to boundary activity hazardous waste, particularly along the U.S./Mexico boundary. The Bush Administration also
made the effort to demonstrate environmental improvement in terms of
questions of staffing and the development of qualified inspectors.
So the EPA has made a significant commitment to working cooperatively towards training inspectors, really trying to address enforcement within Mexico to acquaint them with our experience.
In addition, with respect to the U.S./Mexico boundary, there is
now major activity under way in terms of clean up: enhanced regulatory inspection and enforcement that is conducted jointly. The EPA
region on the West Coast and in San Francisco has been very aggressive in filing enforcement proceedings against companies that do business on the border or on the other side of the border that are U.S.
subsidiaries, where they at least have a claim to jurisdiction.
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So this is an example of where it is not a legal or regulatory requirement, but there is some effort by the Executive Branches to develop the type of infrastructure environmentally that can demonstrate
improvements in environmental management. The Executive Branch
has also attempted to allocate some U.S. priorities to areas that were
the focus of the concerns expressed during the course of the NAFTA
debate.
QUESTION: Mr. Doh: With respect to what is going on at the
border, there are also a couple of new institutions that were created
primarily because the U.S. was considered to have had a particular
stake in environmental reform, particularly dealing with environmental
problems that had transborder implications. For example, we have the
North American Development Bank that borderlines on a cooperation
commission.
I would like to also say that a lot of these kinds of waste water
crimes are funded through tax premium municipal bonds in the United
States. Mexico does not really have such a facility. Now, we have the
possibility of the state of Texas, for example, issuing bonds for development of projects that are on both sides of the border. I think that a lot
of legal cooperation and many economic innovations will arise from
this.
My question has to do with the distinction between the production
process and the actual product. And the Dolphin/Tuna strikes me as
something that is quite clear cut. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) case, however, strikes me as something that is less clear
cut, although I am not very familiar with it. I am wondering if our
speakers could speak to this issue of what is a better remedy for accomplishing a conservation goal, in this case a lower corporate fuel economy with the idea of improving the air climate? In other words, is it
better to have a remedy that applies to a product or to have a remedy
that applies to the production process?
ANSWER: Mr. Spracker: Well, I think this is another example of
a middle ground between the tuna example, and the example I mentioned earlier about the labeling requirements, and the other more typical health and safety standards that can be applied to a product and
can be judged upon entry. It is less intrusive on the sovereignty in other
countries. But it is certainly true that not only the CAFE requirements,
but the new requirements of the Clean Air Act to phase out gas guzzlers has already received a cry from foreign car manufacturers, many
of whom manufacture cars that would not even come close to the mileage fuel efficiency standards that we are posing and which, with respect
to the U.S. domestic automotive industry, are measured on a fleet-wide
basis. So they can offset the luxury car against the economy model and
come up with an average. If you manufacture only luxury cars, you are
not going to have the benefit of that system.
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And yes, one can surely make the point that it is only a product
restriction because the test is in the product (i.e. does the product meet
the test, or does it not?) But fundamentally, I see that as closer to the
process side. It is certainly among the type of ambiguous areas that I
would expect to see tested out in a subsequent round of challenges.
QUESTION: Ms. Dallmeyer: I do not mean to get too deeply into
some of the various aspects of the enforcements, but some of the standard requirements were pretty straight forward. However, some odd
things come up in that the request for submission seems to be aimed at
promoting enforcement rather than perhaps at the industry. A question
that the Secretariat should determine is whether the parties meet the
submission or the requirements. And one of these aspects to consider in
order to be guided towards submission is drawn exclusively from mass
media reports. I was just wondering if you could elaborate on the
knowledge of the agreement?
ANSWER: Mr. Thomas: The "mass media" provision was inserted because the parties were concerned about the international
equivalent to "frivolous and vexatious suits." They wanted to make
sure that a complainant had a genuine interest. They did not want to
make it easy for somebody to send a letter with five or six newspaper
clippings attached to it saying, "You should be investigating this."
To answer your question on what the request for submission was
aimed at promoting, I would say that it is a concern that shows up in
the party-to-party dispute settlement provisions as well. The United
States initially pushed very hard for trade sanctions as the remedy for
a finding of a persistent pattern of non-enforcement. It seemed to the
other parties that if one is really concerned about the integrity of environmental law enforcement, the first thing that ought to be done is to
fashion a remedy which aims at improving environmental law enforcement. Rather than immediately jumping to trade sanctions should we
not give the respondent party, if it has been found to be failing effectively to enforce its law, the opportunity to remedy the situation? That
was inserted then and that is why you see references to action plans.
Only then is there a possibility of trade sanctions. It is the same kind of
thinking that goes back to the public complaints process, about which
there was a concern in that competitors could be using it to harass
competitors rather than out of a genuine concern about enforcement of
environmental law. So that is why that language is in there. It requires
a qualitative judgement by the secretariat.
QUESTION: Ms. Dallmeyer: Am I correct in assuming that this
requires full exhaustion of remedies within the State?
ANSWER: Mr. Thomas: I would not say a full exhaustion. I do
not have it in front of me, but the implication of the language is to
refer the Secretariat to look at whether or not exhaustion has taken
place. Certainly there has to be notice given to the party that there was
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a concern on the part of public complainant.
COMMENT: Mr. Levy: I want to raise the issue of harassment of
companies. U.S. companies were making a very important distinction.
They felt the Agreement should not focus on compliance by companies,
but rather it should focus on whether or not the Party enforced its own
laws. This is as a reason the provision was put in there. The Agreement
has nothing to do with compliance in the sense of what the companies
are doing, but rather what the governments are doing. That was a very
important distinction, both in terms of sovereignty and also in a practical sense of how, at least U.S. companies, were viewing the Agreement
and why they ultimately accepted it.
There was a point where the U.S. companies were basically prepared to throw the NAFTA out after they saw the first U.S. draft. It
was totally unacceptable. And if the U.S. Government persisted on trying to use trade sanctions to force companies' compliance, U.S. industries would have opposed the NAFTA.
QUESTION: Professor King- One of the unique aspects of the
side agreement is the role of the Secretariat now that the FTA has deemphasized its role. They perform administrative functions, but their
role was never successfully enlarged beyond that. They were a repository of information and cases.
Please comment on the role of this new institution, because I think
institutions are very important for purposes of accommodating the conflicts of sovereignty.
ANSWER: Mr. Thomas: I agree with you; I am a big believer in
institutions. I think this in part reflects a difference in philosophy between the Bush and Clinton Administrations and perhaps being early
on in the Clinton Administration, a little bit more idealism than one
might have found say three years into the administration.
I sat as a GATT panelist, and I have worked on FTA panels, so I
had a chance the take a look at the respective contributions of secretariats. I, contrary to many people in the United States, believe that the
GATT Secretariat plays a very important role in supporting the work
of dispute settlement panels.
It provides a whole other dimension in terms of giving the panelist
an understanding of what the tensions are within the organization,
what the state of relations are as between contracting parties. The Secretariat is a repository of GATT lore. It knows about previous decisions
where the issues that are under dispute were addressed before. All of
this is valuable. Significantly, it evolved from two rather tense articles
of the GATT.
In the case of the NAFTA Agreements, the Environmental Secretariat in particular, and the Labor Secretariat, have been given a much
greater advantage from the beginning to evolve in support of the institutions and the respective Councils. The parties have agreed that the
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secretariats are to be independent. The parties are under an obligation
not to attempt to influence the Secretariat in the way in which it discharges its obligation.
So I think the foundation has been laid for institutional growth. In
addition, after the fact, there has been an effort to supplement
NAFTA's institutions with some kind of international coordinating secretariat. You are correct that in the NAFTA the institutional mechanism is sparse. There will be a North American Trade Secretariat in
Mexico City which is to assist the three parties. But whether it is given
sufficient support to evolve over time as the parties become more comfortable with the institutional apparatus of the NAFTA, I am not sure.
ANSWER: Mr. Spracker: I also think it is a very important development. A major concern is about using a trade agreement to address environmental concerns, even with a side agreement or separate
protocol, because the environmental credibility of the system is in the
process that is setup. There is a skepticism on certainly the U.S. side
about whether or not trade agreements are the right vehicle to emphasize the type of health and safety concerns that drive environmental
policy making.
My hope is that the Secretariat will add that environmental credibility to the process, and will bring a level of environmental awareness
to this process that will make the dispute regulation process work successfully; not just in terms of adjudicating it, but giving those decisions
credibility, so that the health and safety concerns here are being addressed and resolved appropriately. So I view it has a hopeful
development.
COMMENT: Professor King: I want to add one point there. I
think in the case of the environment you have a big constituency. This
is an area that is not beyond public scrutiny, and I think what they do
will add a lot to the functioning agreement, or if they are not doing
their job, then perhaps it will decrease some of the impact of the
agreement.
COMMENT: Mr. Levy: Stanley and Chris have made two important points. From an academic as well as a practitioner's point of view,
it is very interesting to go back to the original U.S. proposals, which
raise questions about U.S. sovereignty. Originally, U.S. proposals were
on their face in many instances unconstitutional.
It was clear the Justice Department had not been involved. Most
of the U.S. negotiating positions were ultimately influenced by the Canadian and Mexican negotiators, and also by the U.S. private sector.
Ultimately, looking at the U.S. proposals and their constitutionality,
shifted a lot of the U.S. negotiating positions in terms of what the
power of the Secretariat would be, particularly with subpoena power
and related powers.
I am not an environmental lawyer, but having worked on the envi-
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ronmental side agreement, I constantly was told by people to watch
how the NGO pushes the envelope on procedure through litigation. My
guess is that they would try to push the envelope with the Secretariat,
and it is going to be fascinating to watch the responses of the Secretariat, two parliaments, and a Congress. It will be interesting to watch
how the NGO and all the other interested parties will try to push the
power of the Secretariat, and how that would run up against not only
the question of sovereignty in the international context, but the U.S.
constitution.

